教师队伍建设

“优绩优酬”:关于西北农村教师绩效工资的实验研究

  • 常芳 ,
  • 党伊玮 ,
  • 史耀疆 ,
  • 刘承芳
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  • 1. 陕西师范大学教育实验经济研究所, 西安 710116;
    2. 澳门科技大学商学院, 澳门 999078;
    3. 北京大学现代农学院, 北京 100876

网络出版日期: 2018-07-05

基金资助

高等学校学科创新引智资助计划"西部贫困地区农村人力资本培育智库建设创新引智基地"(B16031);国家自然科学基金面上项目"西北农村小学教师绩效工资政策的实施及影响研究"(71473240)。

An Experimental Study on Performance Pay of Rural Teachers in Northwest China

  • CHANG Fang ,
  • DANG Yiwei ,
  • SHI Yaojiang ,
  • LIU Chengfang
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  • 1. Center for Experimental Economics in Education, Shaanxi Normal University, Xi'an 710116, China;
    2. School of Business, Macau University of Science and Technology, Macau 999078, China;
    3. School of Advanced Agricultural Sciences, Peking University, Beijing 100876, China

Online published: 2018-07-05

摘要

教师是教育的第一资源,如何有效完善教师收入分配激励机制、激发教师工作热情是我国全面深化新时代教师队伍建设改革的重要方面。本研究利用西北农村地区的216所学校的350名数学老师(第一期237名老师,第二期113名老师)10784名学生样本(第一期7373名六年级学生,第二期3411名五年级学生),对老师进行了基于学生成绩"绝对值""增加值"和"增加值百分位"的绩效激励随机干预实验。研究表明,对老师进行增加值百分位的激励方式能够促使老师改变教学行为,将学生的学业表现分别提高0.10到0.15个标准差,尤其是对学困生学业表现的激励效果更明显。增加值百分位的激励方式有效促使老师同等对待所有学生。据此提出改善义务教育阶段教师绩效工资的具体政策建议,激励老师关注发展起点各不相同的农村孩子,给所有孩子一个公平发展的机会。

本文引用格式

常芳 , 党伊玮 , 史耀疆 , 刘承芳 . “优绩优酬”:关于西北农村教师绩效工资的实验研究[J]. 华东师范大学学报(教育科学版), 2018 , 36(4) : 131 -141+167 . DOI: 10.16382/j.cnki.1000-5560.2018.04.013

Abstract

Quality compulsory education plays a crucial role in the development of rural areas in China. The key to quality education is to motivate teachers and guarantee their welfare and interests. The study is based on a survey of 216 schools in rural areas, involving 350 math teachers and 10,768 students, to examine the effect of performance incentive on education quality. In a randomized intervention trial, 237 mathematics teachers and 7,357 students in the sixth grade participated in the first investigation, and 113 mathematics teachers and 3,411 students of the fifth grade participated in the second investigation. The findings show that percentile incentives based on increased students' performance help to encourage teachers to improve their teaching performance. Their students' academic performance was increased by 0. 10 to 0. 15 standard devia-tion, and below-average students show remarkable improvement. The results suggest the percentile incentives based on students' academic performance effectively promote performance of all students. Finally, we put for-ward strategies to improve teacher performance by percentile incentives, which is expected to encourage teach-ers to address the learning needs of all students.

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