二十世纪初期罗素对杜威“逻辑”的批评，在今天体现着学术界对批判性思维（以及创新思维）教育的一种分歧，即，教人论证，还是教人探究？本文从“克里福德原则”引入在早期分析哲学家中流行的一种论证观念，进而考察罗素与杜威关于“探究”观念的著名争议及其“无果而终”的尴尬结局。借助于当代教育思想家图尔敏的广义论证观念，重新审视杜威的“探究理论”，可以澄清罗素对于杜威的批评何以是一种方法论上的（而非只是文本上的）误解。本文在教育哲学上的结论并非“要么论证要么探究”，因为当我们坚持从广义上理解“论证”一词时，“教人论证”与“教人探究”实乃可以彼此沟通与转化的教育目标；但从语用修辞上看，由于“探究”一词强调参与论证之人要从生动的经验中发现问题并在开放的经验中探索问题解决之道，它有助于防止或纠正教师和学生把论证狭隘地理解为语言诡辩或文本游戏。

Russell’s critique against Dewey’s new logic in the early 20^th century is a symbol of some controversy over the orientation of critical thinking training. This article sets out from a conception of argument popular in earlier analytic philosophy, exemplified by the Principle of Clifford, and thereby examines the historical quarrel over “inquiry” between Russell and Dewey and its embarrassing outcome. After introducing the new conception of argument propounded eminently by Stephen Toulmin and embedding it in Dewey’s theory of inquiry, it is showed in what sense Russell’s criticism against Dewey was based upon some serious misunderstanding of Dewey’s methodology as well as of his key texts. At last, for the viewpoint of philosophy of education, this article suggests that the conception of argument-as-inquiry has the advantage of emphasizing arguers’ engaging in a variety of living experience and warning them against converting academic arguments into some sort of linguistic games.