Journal of East China Normal University(Educational Sciences) >
Research on Risks and Countermeasures of Running Private Schools by Group
Accepted date: 2022-08-06
Online published: 2022-09-29
Private education group is an important form of capital market and education industry combination, which has a profound influence on the healthy development of private education by effectively utilizing capital market. Private education groups engage two different industries (education and business) and its regulation and operation are facing many risks. Private education group supervision responsibility is not clear; the regulatory means are limited, and law enforcement is weak. Irregularities for profit weaken school legal person property rights, underrate public assets as well. Crossover cross-regional wanton expansion and multi-stakeholder bound would trigger a series of operational risk. Penetrating management of groups deprives member schools’ running autonomy. Listed private education groups control member schools to withdraw funds or conduct connected transactions through structured contracts. Equity financing may lead to barbarian acquisition and profit outflow of non-profit schools. Illegal borrowing and misappropriation of member schools’ funds and investment in non-educational industries may lead to capital chain fracture. International capital investment in private education groups and the establishment of a series of international schools may damage national education sovereignty. It is urgent to establish the governance system, prevent and control assets management risks, regulate excessive and illegal affiliate transactions, and take multiple measures simultaneously to ensure a smooth transition of listed private education group.
Jiayong Zhang , Yuhua Zhu . Research on Risks and Countermeasures of Running Private Schools by Group[J]. Journal of East China Normal University(Educational Sciences), 2022 , 40(10) : 108 -116 . DOI: 10.16382/j.cnki.1000-5560.2022.10.010
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