Educational Fiscal Policy Interaction and Regional Coordinated Development: A Perspective of Spatial Spillover Effect

doi:10.16382/j.cnki.1000-5560.2021.06.010

Abstract

Abstract:

From the perspective of spatial spillover effects, we conduct a spatial econometric analysis on the panel data of 194 cities in China from 2004 to 2018. The purpose of our empirical test is to verify the existence of strategic interaction in education expenditures between local governments. Besides, the paper also aims at examining the intrinsic motivation and incentive mechanism of local government education expenditures. The results show that local governments have significant complementary strategic interactions with their geographical and demographic neighbors in education fiscal policy. Moreover, the education expenditures of local governments are significantly affected by economic basis, fiscal characteristics, institutional inertia and official promotion. We also found that governments in different regions have a heterogeneous feedback mechanism towards central budget. The governments in eastern region are more sensitive. Therefore, the education development plan of central government should take the spatial spillover effect and the regional heterogeneity into consideration. Only in this way can the plan better balance the allocation of educational resources and promote coordinated regional development.

Key words: local government, education fiscal policy, strategy interaction, spatial spillover effect

Yingxuan Li, Yi Fang. Educational Fiscal Policy Interaction and Regional Coordinated Development: A Perspective of Spatial Spillover Effect[J]. Journal of East China Normal University(Educational Sciences), 2021, 39(6): 112-125.

Figures/Tables 5

References 0

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变量	平均	标准差	峰度	偏度	最小值	最大值	单位
生均教育投入	?1.711	1.254	0.031	?0.326	?8.919	1.557	万元/万人
产业结构	?0.869	0.255	2.766	?0.792	?2.456	?0.227	%
经济基础	?0.219	1.140	?0.296	0.160	?3.187	2.889	亿元
人口密度	?1.415	1.173	0.700	?0.231	?5.930	2.114	万人/平方公里
财政预算	?2.583	1.397	?0.213	?0.099	?6.753	1.183	元/万人
基础设施	0.927	0.894	0.043	0.153	?2.151	3.993	万平方米/万人
分权程度	?0.906	0.948	0.159	0.119	?3.702	2.055	%
人力资本	?4.731	1.020	0.055	0.237	?9.442	?1.934	%
官员晋升	0.273	0.445	?0.955	1.022	0.000	1.000	—
经济增长	11.362	4.078	3.695	?0.593	?15.070	31.700	%
政策惯性	11.104	1.183	?0.064	?0.055	4.248	14.740	亿元
官员教育	0.976	0.154	36.075	?6.168	0.000	1.000	—

变量	模型（1）	模型（2）	模型（3）	模型（4）	模型（5）
变量	OLS	地理权重	人口权重	地理权重	人口权重
$ \mathrm{\delta } $		0.480***	0.076**	0.413***	0.070*
产业结构	?0.086**	?0.067	?0.093**	?0.073*	?0.090**
经济基础	0.251***	0.148**	0.235***	0.158**	0.234***
人口密度	0.137***	0.125***	0.145***	0.148***	0.164***
财政预算	?0.044*	?0.064***	?0.041*	?0.061***	?0.042*
基础设施	?0.078***	?0.068***	?0.078***	?0.073***	?0.078***
分权程度	0.585***	0.599***	0.580***	0.546***	0.529***
产业结构交叉项		?0.686*	0.236*	?1.015**	0.197
经济基础交叉项		0.586	0.484***	0.119	0.465***
人口密度交叉项		0.244*	?0.139***	0.226	?0.099**
财政预算交叉项		0.716***	?0.007	0.767***	?0.005
基础设施交叉项		?0.800***	?0.091*	?0.829***	?0.075
分权程度交叉项		?1.02***	?0.013	?1.143***	0.000
人力资本				?0.012	?0.018
官员晋升				0.011	0.009
经济增长				?0.004**	?0.002
政策惯性				0.166***	0.164***
官员教育				?0.054	?0.061
人力资本交叉项				0.229	?0.078
官员晋升交叉项				?0.221**	0.035
经济增长交叉项				?0.003	0.001
政策惯性交叉项				0.050	?0.011
官员教育交叉项				?0.624	?0.098
样本量	2910	2910	2910	2910	2910
$ {R}^{2} $	0.297	0.937	0.936	0.940	0.938
调整 $ {R}^{2} $	0.296	0.313	0.302	0.340	0.326
$ {\sigma }^{2} $	0.055	0.057	0.058	0.055	0.056
$ \mathrm{l}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{g}-\mathrm{l}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{k}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{d} $		139.202	112.100	195.202	162.664
WALD空间滞后检验		48.955***	21.529***	59.031***	17.606*
WALD空间误差检验		51.074***	22.485***	60.024***	18.723*
LR空间滞后检验		57.855***	23.499***	67.903***	19.311*
LR空间误差检验		61.667***	24.428***	70.557***	20.286**

	变量	模型（2）	模型（3）	模型（4）	模型（5）
	变量	地理权重	人口权重	地理权重	人口权重
直接效应	产业结构	?0.073*	?0.091**	?0.083**	?0.087**
	经济基础	0.155**	0.243***	0.161**	0.240***
	人口密度	0.128***	0.144***	0.151***	0.164***
	财政预算	?0.057**	?0.041*	?0.057**	?0.042*
	基础设施	?0.075***	?0.079***	?0.080***	?0.078***
	分权程度	0.591***	0.581***	0.540***	0.529***
	人力资本			?0.009	?0.018
	官员晋升			0.009	0.009
	经济增长			?0.004**	?0.002
	政策惯性			0.168***	0.164***
	官员教育			?0.057	?0.062*
空间溢出效应	产业结构	?1.438*	0.248*	?1.841**	0.195
	经济基础	1.298	0.536***	0.271	0.503***
	人口密度	0.593**	?0.137***	0.493**	?0.094**
	财政预算	1.338***	?0.011	1.267***	?0.009
	基础设施	?1.634***	?0.100*	?1.487***	?0.086
	分权程度	?1.424***	0.034	?1.572***	0.038
	人力资本			0.376	?0.086
	官员晋升			?0.388**	0.039
	经济增长			?0.009	0.001
	政策惯性			0.210	0.000
	官员教育			?1.115	?0.112
总效应	产业结构	?1.511**	0.157	?1.924***	0.108
	经济基础	1.453	0.779***	0.432	0.743***
	人口密度	0.72**	0.007	0.644***	0.070
	财政预算	1.281***	?0.052	1.209***	?0.051
	基础设施	?1.709***	?0.179***	?1.567***	?0.164***
	分权程度	?0.833*	0.614***	?1.032**	0.567***
	人力资本			0.367	?0.105
	官员晋升			?0.378**	0.048
	经济增长			?0.013	?0.001
	政策惯性			0.378	0.164***
	官员教育			?1.171	?0.175

变量名称	模型（6）	模型（7）	模型（8）	模型（9）	模型（10）	模型（11）
	全域	全域	东部	东部	中西部	中西部
	2004—2010	2011—2018	2004—2010	2011—2018	2004—2010	2011—2018
$ \mathrm{\delta } $	0.178	0.325***	0.306**	0.174	0.266**	0.286**
样本量	1358	1552	476	544	882	1008
WALD空间滞后检验	13.089**	43.317***	12.543*	17.205***	13.682**	50.335***
WALD空间误差检验	14.806**	46.727***	12.087*	21.926***	14.541**	48.393***
LR空间滞后检验	16.618**	57.194***	16.005**	24.530***	16.759**	60.095***
LR空间误差检验	18.140***	61.921***	15.806**	28.605***	17.436***	59.215***

[1]	Chunjin Chen. Spatial Spillover Effects of Public Education Expenditure under the Vision of Common Prosperity [J]. Journal of East China Normal University(Educational Sciences), 2023, 41(10): 80-91.
[2]	Jia Qian, Wanpeng Lei, Hongmei Ma. The Policy Statements and the Fiscal Education Investment Efforts of Local Governments: An Empirical Study Based on City-Level Panel Data [J]. Journal of East China Normal University(Educational Sciences), 2021, 39(2): 50-60.